A Minsky Moment
Noel Tracy
Associate Professor in Political and International Studies
Flinders University
Paper delivered at the International Workshop on the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis, Adelaide, 16th May 2008
Why do I describe the onset of the current crisis in the Sub-prime Mortgage market, or more accurately originating in the securitization of that market, as a “Minsky Moment”? Minsky had always seen the origin of financial crises in the fragility of the credit system. As the economy grows strongly, a “bubble” develops in the property or stock market or both from exuberance regarding the prospects for substantial gains in asset values. Both the growth of the economy and the “bubble” are financed by rapidly increasing growth in credit. As credit is increasingly used to finance this speculation, assets are frequently pledged to obtain further credit for more purchases of similar assets. As a result, a debt mountain grows backed by these “bubble”- valued assets as collateral. Two things become unsustainable – the “bubble” and the debt mountain .
Suddenly in response to either fears in the market that the “bubble” has peaked or some shock to the system – like a major default – the market turns into a tailspin. Suddenly everyone is in trouble. The exuberance and euphoria of the “bubble” now turn into revulsion. What had been a sellers’ market now turns into a buyers’ market but with few buyers despite the bargains available. Owners of assets must sell to cut their losses sending the market down still further. Many investors now have negative equity or face margin calls that they cannot meet. While the client borrowers are in deep trouble, it is the banks, which face the deepest crisis. Having loaned irresponsibly, they are now left holding collateral worth less than the loans advanced against them. Many of their clients will not be able to advance funds to cover the difference while those with negative equity in the assets will be tempted to walk away and let the bank deal with the problem by repossessing the asset, be it a residence, an investment property or shares. The banks are now filled with bad and doubtful debts. In severe crises, these may well exceed the capital of the banks making them technically insolvent. Banks now need more capital. Banks, which previously had been anxious to lend are now desperate to get money back into the bank to cover these losses and avoid bankruptcy or, even if that is not a genuine risk, to avoid making new calls for capital to their shareholders. Even those still solvent now turn risk averse. Credit is now at a premium. Even the best corporations cannot borrow on favourable terms. Loans that they had assumed could be rolled over are called in. Soon we have a credit crunch and the economy is heading for recession.
While there are a number of new factors in the current crisis the overall picture is the same. This is the latest in a long line of financial crises produced by irresponsible lending and borrowing – The Third World Debt Crisis of the early 1980s, the Global Stock Market Crash of 1987, the Japanese Meltdown of 1990-91 with a second round in 1997-98, the Asian Financial Crash of 1997-99, the Dot.Com Crash of 2001 – in which “bubbles” financed by the growth of debt mountains burst and threatened the global financial system with meltdown. In all of these crises, including the current one, the management of risk in the financial system has been nothing short of disastrous while the regulation of the financial sector has been found wanting.
What is interesting about all these crises is that despite all the talk about “the efficiency of market mechanisms”, these have never been able or permitted to resolve any of these crises. It has always been governments, central banks and international financial institutions that have had to pick up the pieces to prevent major bankruptcies among the leading international banks and likely resultant global financial panic. The market solution to insolvency is bankruptcy but while this can be allowed to occur for the small players, it is too dangerous to permit it to occur for major banks. Thus “bailouts” on generous terms have been, are and will be the norm. Where even these measures fail, as in the UK with Northern Rock, failed banks will be taken into public ownership. This is already happening on a gigantic scale in the current crisis. Central banks have pumped vast amounts of new money into the system to boost liquidity. Interest rates have been lowered in the United States to a point where money for the banks is free. Major banks have had to sell large amounts of preferential stock to re-capitalize their depleted treasuries, most of it to “sovereign funds” from China, the Gulf States and Singapore.
Why is there a credit crunch despite all the injections of new money into the system? The problem for the banks is not liquidity, it is insolvency. Were the banks to be forced to revalue their assets to realistic levels based upon realisable value, many, including some of the largest global players, would face bankruptcy. Thus they must keep the new money in the bank. The liquidity crisis will continue.
This adds an additional problem. Despite the substantial liquidity pumped into the financial system by Central Banks, banks are unwilling even to lend to each other – the inter-bank market has dried up. Given their knowledge about their own dubious assets, they fear other banks are an equally poor risk because they may have a similar exposure or worse. The system is grinding to a halt.
While the underlining fundamentals of this crisis are not much different from those of past crises and easily fit into the Minsky model, there are some new elements. This is the first crisis engendered by the brave new world of securitization. This time the “investment euphoria” has been in the dubious paper of securitized sub-prime mortgages backed by an “ever rising” real estate market. It is also the first crisis with its roots in the “over-the counter” market. This latter has had a poisonous impact on the overall securities market. Transactions in this “market” now far exceed those on the world’s stock exchanges. Unlike the stock market, where securities can be instantly valued and where the causes of rises and falls can be identified in the actions of known buyers and sellers, there is no such system of clear valuation nor of buyers and sellers of the securities traded on the “over-the counter” market. It is opaque in the extreme and almost totally unregulated. Thus, valuing bank assets, and those of other financial institutions, has become more difficult and, therefore, quantifying the extent of losses much more difficult.
The danger, given the difficulties of valuing and the extent of these assets in their balance sheets, is that banks will be tempted to avoid writing off the losses from these now near worthless securities. This is the situation, which occurred in Japan after the crash of 1990-91, when the banks hid their losses. The result of those disastrous decisions was to produce decade-long stagnation in the Japanese economy. Banks exposed to these risks, must be forced to face up to the extent of their losses, write these off and seek new capital if this outcome is to be avoided.
While the more optimistic commentators are suggesting the worst is over, the last word should perhaps be left to the IMF. In its Global Stability Report released in April 2008, it suggests total losses from the crisis will reach US$1trillion. If this is true, and the evidence tends to suggest it is, the worst is still to come and the question is how far the financial crisis will drag the rest of the US and global economy down.
Tracy/A Minsky Moment/May 2008